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Faces, Bodies, and Communication
Sometime about 250,000 y ago, primates
started talking to each other (1). Before that
time facial expressions and body language
were the main modes of communication
among primates. Even today in the presence
of our sophisticated language system, face
and body gestures play a major role in hu-
man communication. If someone tells you
that she is not bored with a conversation
but her half-open eyelids, raised eyebrows,
dropped shoulders, and the way she puts her
hand under her chin “tell” you the opposite,
you would probably trust the ancient signal
more than the modern sounds that we call
words. In a recent PNAS article, Fisher and
Freiwald (2) might have unveiled where in
the brain such signals are encoded.
Understanding the basis of face–body re-
presentation in the primate brain is crucial
for developing a mechanistic theory of hu-
man behavior because faces and bodies are
the main objects of interest in a wide range of
primate behaviors, including identification,
nonverbal communication, coaction, and
social cognition. Past studies have revealed a
hierarchy of neural clusters in the inferior
temporal (IT) cortex of humans and ma-
caque monkeys that selectively responds to
the images of faces (3–6). This hierarchy is
thought to causally support face-recognition
behavior (7–9). A separate constellation of
neural clusters was also found to represent
images of bodies and body parts (10). Now,
using functional MRI in macaque monkeys,
Fisher and Freiwald (2) successfully demon-
strate a systematic development of whole-
agent (a face and its body together) selectivity
through the processing hierarchy of the IT
cortex. Specifically, the authors show that
although the responses of the posterior parts
of the face-selective network (lower in the
hierarchy) are mainly driven by isolated im-
ages of faces (and not bodies), some anterior
parts of this network (higher in the hierar-
chy) prefer images of a whole-agent: a face
mounted on a body. This is the first time that
a synergic interaction in the neural responses
to faces and bodies is documented. This
finding suggests increasing intercommunica-
tion of face and body signals through the
visual information-processing hierarchy in
the brain.
Doesn’t Have to Be Like This, but It Is
One notable point about Fisher and Freiwald’s
(2) finding is that the brain doesn’t have to
be wired like this to support whole-agent
recognition at the behavioral level. In other
words, the fact that we can behaviorally
combine the visual information of bodies
and faces and recognize people as whole-
agents does not necessitate existence of
neural clusters (at the spatial scale of milli-
meters, detectable by functional MRI) that
respond to whole-agents more than their
parts. A neural system can separate and
recognize different classes of objects by giving
proper weights to their elements (11, 12)
without necessarily having to represent them
as whole stimuli, either at the single neuron
level or at such large spatial scales. For ex-
ample, we can use different features of cars
(shape of the headlights, curvature of the
hood, and so forth) to identify different types
of cars, but this behavioral ability does not
imply that the neural networks in our heads
have neurons that respond to images of
whole cars. This logic makes Fisher and
Freiwald’s (2) results not necessarily expec-
ted, and thus informative and important.
This also drives the need for learning more
about this system to understand what com-
putational (e.g., wiring length constraints) and
evolutionary forces (need for faster reaction
times, and so forth) have shaped the pro-
cessing schema in this particular way.
Detection vs. Discrimination Trade-Off
One possible misunderstanding about the
role of categorical neural representations in
behavior (high level or low level) is the con-
fusion between “detection” and “discrimina-
tion” behavioral tasks. To remain careful with
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Fig. 1. Detection vs. discrimination trade-off. A perfect “category detector” neuron (a neuron that distinguishes an
object category from all other objects; e.g., a “face neuron” or a “whole-agent” neuron) cannot encode within-
category differences because it has to minimize its within-category response variation to provide the strongest (most
noise-tolerant) signal to contrast the category of interest against other categories. Alternatively, a “within-category
discriminator” neuron (a neuron that distinguishes different members of a category; e.g., different faces or different
whole-agents) should maximize its response variation across the members of category of interest; thus, it is not a good
category detector. Each subplot schematically depicts the neuron’s response (ordinate) for various visual stimuli. The
abscissae indicate the visual stimuli ranked based on their category and the neural responses they can drive. The pink
bar spans the stimuli that belong to the category of interest (e.g., faces or whole-agents) and the green bar spans
visual stimuli that belong to other categories. The Left subplot shows a hypothetical ideal category detector (face
detector in this case) that responds invariantly to all faces but not to any other object. This neuron cannot signal the
differences between faces (for face-discrimination tasks). The Center subplot shows the same for a neuron that
conveys some category detection signal and some within-category discrimination signal. The Right subplot represents
a neuron that uses its maximum dynamic range for within-category discrimination, thus is a great discriminator but a
poor category detector. The dashed blue lines indicate alternative scenarios for the neurons’ responses to “other”
categories. Note that a neuron can respond to other categories (thus convey no detection signal) but remain a good
within-category discriminator.
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interpretation of the current findings about
whole-agent representation in the IT cortex,
this confusion should be carefully addressed.
The case of “face neurons” provides a great
example. Face neurons are traditionally de-
fined as the neurons whose responses dis-
criminate images of faces from images of
nonface stimuli (13). Based on this definition,
an ideal face neuron is a neuron that re-
sponds invariantly to all instances of face
images and does not respond to images of
nonface objects. This hypothetical face neu-
ron could directly mediate face detection
behavior (detecting faces with various sizes,
identities, and so forth among other objects).
However, such a neuron does not necessarily
support other face-related tasks, such as face
discrimination (distinguishing different faces
from each other). In fact, tuning a neuron as
a good detector for any given object class
(e.g., faces) will take a toll on the neuron’s
ability to discriminate members of that object
class (e.g., different faces) from each other.
This is because in the presence of natural
noise, a good detector should have minimal
response variation to different instances of
the category it detects (14). On the other
hand, a neuron tuned to discriminate mem-
bers of a given category from each other has
to maximize its response variation to them
(e.g., different faces); this will consequently take
a toll on the neuron’s detection performance
for the encoded category because it will re-
spond low to some of the members of the
object category. Fig. 1 provides a schematic
summary of this theoretical trade-off. Sur-
prisingly for the case of faces, inactivation
of chunks of the brain that contain “face-
detector neurons” reduces the face-discrimi-
nation behavioral performance (9, 15), but this
can easily result from the fine-grained spatial
mix up of the detector and discriminator
neurons (15).
The same logic applies to any other cate-
gorical neural representation that is defined
by a “detection contrast”: contrasting the av-
erage neural responses to a given object class
to that of other object classes. This includes
whole-agent neural responses in the IT cor-
tex as well. The fact that an IT neural cluster
(cluster AF) responds more to the images
of whole-agents compared with other
image categories (a detection contrast), di-
rectly suggests its involvement in whole-
agent detection behaviors, such as noticing
a person in the room, noticing a predator
Fisher and Freiwald
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an area of the macaque
brain that responds to
the images of whole-
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sum response to iso-
lated images of faces
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in the dark, and so forth. Involvement of
this neural cluster in discrimination tasks,
such as reading the face–body language, dis-
criminating people from each other, and
other instances of social cognition is still
possible (because no neuron in a real brain is
an ideal detector and because detector and
discriminator neurons may be spatially
mixed); however, it is currently less sup-
ported by direct evidence. This aspect is
particularly important because using a de-
tection contrast here (whole-agents vs. other
stimuli) might have washed up potential
neural responses in other cortical areas that
may respond differentially to different whole-
agents. I expect that Fisher and Freiwald’s (2)
important finding opens the door to further
explorations such as using multivoxel pattern
analysis, single-unit neural recordings, and
causal studies (e.g., measuring the direct effect
of inactivation of this area on whole-agent
discrimination behavior) to determine how
whole-agents are encoded in the primate
brain.
Forward
Fisher and Freiwald (2) reveal for the first time
an area of the macaque brain that responds to
the images of whole-agents more than its sum
response to isolated images of faces and
bodies. Given the importance of whole-
agent perception in human behavior and
the potential link between this brain area and
a wide range of whole-agent related behaviors
(such as social cognition), this is a remarkable
finding. It is now time to systematically an-
swer a series of questions that naturally rise
from the study: how do face- and body-
selective areas of the brain interact at the
neural circuit level? How does this area en-
code various face–body configurations? How
does this area represent the differences be-
tween different people (whole-agents)? Does
this area causally support a set of whole-agent
related (detection and discrimination) be-
haviors? Hopefully future studies will shed
more light on this interesting and exciting area
of science.
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